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Abstract
The multifaceted nature of cyber-physical systems needs holistic study methods
to detect essential aspects and interrelations among physical and cyber com-
ponents. Like the systems themselves, security threats feature both cyber and
physical elements. Although to apply divide et impera approaches helps han-
dling system complexity, to consider just one aspect at a time does not provide
adequate risk awareness and hence does not allow to design the most appropri-
ate countermeasures. To support this claim, in this paper we provide a joint
application of two model-driven techniques for physical and cyber-security eval-
uation. We apply two UML profiles, namely SecAM (for cyber-security) and
CIP_VAM (for physical security), in combination. In such a way, we demon-
strate the synergy between both profiles and the need for their tighter integration
in the context of a reference case study from the railway domain.
Keywords: Cyber-Physical Systems, Vulnerability Assessment, UML Profile,
Bayesian Networks, Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
∗Corresponding author
Email address: stefano.marrone@unina2.it (Stefano Marrone)
Preprint submitted to Journal of Computers & Electrical Engineering July 4, 2015
1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems emerged as a branch of the embedded systems re-
search specifically focused on the interaction between the computational ele-
ments and the physical entities [1]. When research on cyber-physical systems
overlaps with the emerging paradigms of smart-cities, Internet-of-Things and5
intelligent transportation, to name a few, then security issues become critical
whereas distributed systems can be exposed to both physical and cyber-threats.
It is a matter of fact that while researchers seem to be well-aware of the physical
effects of cyber-threats, much of the research on information, on “logical”, or on
“cyber” security are not related to physical sensing. However, many threats to10
cyber-physical systems (especially when they are isolated from the Internet) are
also originated from physical intrusions, e.g., intruders accessing control termi-
nals in technical rooms. This kind of information should be fused with the one
coming from logical intrusion detection to provide a superior situation awareness
and early warnings; thus, merging physical with logical access control allows to15
recognise otherwise undetectable identity frauds.
Many safety-critical systems, as the ones used for railway control, are un-
reachable from the Internet but have technical equipment located in geograph-
ically distributed shelters and used for actuation, power, and telecommunica-
tions. This equipment is normally used by maintainers and other authorised20
personnel, but can be potentially targeted by unauthorised personnel through
the same physical access points. Since trackside shelters and technical rooms
are nowadays equipped with physical security and environmental monitoring
devices, security threat analysis can be advantageously fed with both physical
and logical elements [2].25
Nowadays, holistic modelling of complex systems is still a challenging re-
search issue, being largely accepted that the more promising and scalable ap-
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proaches focus on modularity and composability (both in modelling and solv-
ing). Another promising research effort aims at using as much as possible de
facto standards in systems modelling, as the Unified Modelling Language (UML)30
together with extensions and Domain Specific Modelling Languages (DSMLs),
in order to provide a modeller with easy-to-use, reusable tools. This enables
to build cohesive system views while hiding the underlying complexity of the
analysis process, often based on model-to-model (M2M) transformations and or-
chestration of different solvers for different formalisms biased on the evaluation35
objectives.
In this paper, we take advantage of two novel UML profiles, namely Secu-
rity Analysis and Modelling (SecAM) [3] and Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Vulnerability Analysis and Modeling (CIP_VAM) [4], to address the mod-
elling of digital and physical security in combination. The approach moves from40
separate usage of the two profiles, through a loosely coupled one, pointing to-
wards a fully and strictly integrated profile including the modelling potential of
both SecAM and CIP_VAM. Besides, we also show how each profile benefits
by the information contained in the other in the formal models generated and
used for quantitative security evaluations. We combine the usage of SecAM and45
CIP_VAM to exploit synergies in modelling and analysis of cyber and physical
security aspects: from UML models annotated by both profiles, a cyber and
physical security analysis can be performed coping with the complexity of crit-
ical infrastructure protection. We finally evaluate our approach in an intrusion
scenario in railway trackside/lineside shelters.50
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the re-
lated work, introduces SecAM, CIP_VAM, and background needed to follow
the rest of the paper. Section 3 describes the reference case study of the railway
shelter used to motivate our research. Section 4 introduces the vulnerability
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modelling, considering separately physical and cyber security. Then, Section 555
considers them jointly, and proposes some modelling enhancements. Section 6
demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach by means of sensitivity analyses.
Finally, discussion and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Related Work and Background
2.1. Related Work60
Model-based evaluation of computer and network security has a long story,
dating back to the first techniques to model and evaluate system dependabil-
ity [5]. Dependability and security model-based evaluation approaches encom-
pass combinatorial methods (e.g., based on Reliability Block Diagrams, Fault
Trees, or Attack Trees), State-Based Stochastic Methods (e.g., through Markov65
Reward Models or Stochastic Petri Nets), Model Checking (e.g., automatic at-
tack graphs generation [6]), or a combined used of several methods and for-
malisms [7]. However, security of critical infrastructures like those for mass-
transit transportation is a multi-facet problem that requires an integrated ap-
proach taking into account digital (i.e., cyber) security as well as physical secu-70
rity, which is strictly related to system protection against intentional threats of
physical nature. In physical vulnerability assessment, a quantitative notion of
vulnerability is used and commonly defined as the likelihood that an attempted
attack is successful [8]. In this direction, practical applications for vulnerability
analysis use statistical approaches and mathematical modelling [9, 10]. Nev-75
ertheless, model-based approaches for cyber-security and physical security are
separately considered and applied.
A recent trend in critical system modelling for security and dependability
analysis envisions top-down model-driven approaches that automatically derive
quantitative models. These approaches rely on DSMLs or UML profiles for80
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specification and modelling of a kind of systems. Model-driven processes en-
able automated modelling and analysis of different solutions during the overall
system development life-cycle (for instance, security solutions or design choices)
and they maybe easily integrated in industrial settings. So far, few DSMLs or
profiles exist specifically tailored for modelling security and vulnerability as-85
pects of critical infrastructures. CORAS [11] assists in modelling and analysing
the risk of changing systems in terms of their Quality of Service and fault tol-
erance characteristics. MARTE [12] is an OMG standard profile for modelling
and analysing non-functional properties of real-time embedded systems. Simi-
larly, Dependability Analysis and Modelling (DAM) [13] is a non-standard spe-90
cialization of MARTE that supports dependability analysis. Regarding UML
profiles addressing security, UMLsec [14] allows to specify security information
during the development of security-critical systems and provides tool-support
for formal security verification. An UML extension is also proposed in [15] for
model-based security assessment. UMLintr [16] is other profile for specifying in-95
trusion scenarios. Other UML profiles focus on security in grid computing [17]
or distributed systems [18]. In this sense, CIP_VAM [4, 19] is a recent UML
profile that addresses physical protection of critical infrastructures and provides
tool support for automatic generation of vulnerability models based on Bayesian
Networks (BNs). However, it does not consider cyber-security issues. Another100
recent UML profile, SecAM [20, 3], overcomes this issue since it allows specifying
cyber-security aspects while enabling its assessment.
At the best of our knowledge, there are a lot of scientific works comparing
UML profiles in different contexts but there are only few of them exploring the
synergies of a joint use: in [21], MARTE, SysML, and UMLSec are used to model105
non-functional properties of telecommunication systems; in [22], MARTE and
MARTE-DAM are mixed to allow evaluation of performance and dependability.
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With respect to these works, the proposed approach also pursues the objective
of improving existing transformational approaches by the joint use of different
UML profiles rather than to use existing transformations separately.110
2.2. The CIP_VAM Profile and Bayesian Networks
CIP_VAM [4] is an UML profile for vulnerability analysis and modelling in
the field of critical infrastructure protection; conceived and developed within the
European project METRIP1 under the “Prevention, Preparedness and Conse-
quence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme”115
to support design and evaluation of physical protection systems. CIP_VAM ex-
tends UML with concepts for modelling critical assets (Infrastructure package),
attack scenarios (Attack package), and protection devices (Protection package).
A more detailed description of CIP_VAM subpackages can be found in [4].
By applying proper model transformations on a CIP_VAM-annotated UML120
model, it is possible to obtain a BN model. BNs [23] provide a graphical repre-
sentation of a joint probability distribution over a set of random variables with
a possible mutual causal relationship. The network is a directed acyclic graph
whose nodes represent random variables and arcs represent a probabilistic de-
pendence between two random variables. A conditional probability distribution125
is defined for each node in the network: for discrete random variables, it is often
represented by a Conditional Probability Table (CPT). Founded on the Bayes’
theorem, BNs allow for inferring the posterior conditional probability distribu-
tion of a hypothesis (outcome variable) based on observed evidence and a prior
belief in the probability of different hypotheses.130
2.3. The SecAM Profile and Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
SecAM [20, 3] is an UML profile designed for the security analysis and mod-
1http://metrip.unicampus.it/
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elling of software systems. It allows attack/resilience, cryptography, security
mechanisms, and access control issues to be expressed within UML models. Se-
cAM is built in the top of MARTE [12] and DAM [13] profile, which makes it a135
powerful framework where performance, dependability, and security properties
can be expressed. A more detailed description of SecAM subpackages can be
found in [3].
By applying proper model transformations on a SecAM-annotated UML
model, it is possible to obtain a Generalized Stochastic Petri nets (GSPN)140
model. A GSPN [24] is a graphical and mathematical formalism that allows
to specify both temporal and logic evolution within the same model. A GSPN
is a bipartite graph in which the nodes (places and transitions) are connected
by directed arcs. Tokens (drawn as black dots within places) are used to specify
and to evolve the state of a Petri net (PN) by means of the firing rule: fir-145
ing of the transitions determines the change of the number of tokens in places.
A GSPN distinguishes two kind of transitions: immediate, which fire at zero
time (i.e., its firing does not consume any time) and are represented by thin
black bars; and timed, which can follow different firing distributions and are
represented by white boxes. In this paper, we consider that delays of timed150
transitions are exponentially distributed random variables.
3. Case Study: Lineside Shelter Scenario
This section describes the case-study of the lineside shelter protection sys-
tem. Shelters are small buildings located in railway track sides. They usually
contain electronic equipment performing control functions on interlocking de-155
vices (e.g., light signals, railway switches, etc.). As the complexity of railway
systems increases, such functions are more and more demanded to computer-
based systems, which are often connected to open networks. However, some
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commands to the railway devices are disallowed in a remote control scenario.
In these situations, shelter computers send diagnostic data to a Central Com-160
mand Center, while maintenance actions are performed only via a local termi-
nal. Hence, since shelters feature critical security issues, appropriate protections
must be employed.
Figure 1 depicts the layout of a common lineside shelter, used as a reference
example in this paper. The shelter is a small building, accessed by a door con-165
trolled by a Door Access control device (e.g., a card reader or keypad). The first
room accessible by the door features intrusion presence detection sensors (e.g.,
passive infrared), a Fog Generator (i.e., a device to temporarily blind intruders
by generating an artificial mist). A rack is also located at this room, containing
two servers: a Signalling Server (or Traffic Server) that controls the railway170
devices; and a Cyber-Physical Protection (CPP) Server that is responsible of
monitoring the shelter security. Figure 2 depicts an UML Deployment diagram
describing the cyber-physical architecture of the shelter.
CPP
Server
Terminal
Signalling 
Server
Presence
Sensor
Fog
Generator
Door
Access Rack
Figure 1: The lineside shelter reference plant.
In nominal operating conditions, the shelter is accessed by maintenance per-
sonnel with their access keys. Maintainers log in the system via the terminal to175
perform the required interventions, e.g., to fix some problems. Several threat
scenarios can be considered where physical or cyber security are addressed sep-
arately: for example, the case of an unauthorised access to the room to steal
some stuff, or a remote intrusion to sabotage the Traffic Server). Proper coun-
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termeasures can be activated to cope with these threats (e.g., fog generator and180
user disconnection, respectively). Nevertheless, scenarios that combine physical
and cyber attacks are also possible. Since we focus on combined attacks, let us
consider the following scenario:
Insider Threat. A CyberPhysical Trudy, defined as an “intruder able to per-
form an attack requiring both physical and cyber actions”, wants to sabotage185
the Traffic Server. We assume here that the attacker is part of the personnel
who is allowed to physically access the shelter room but not allowed to login
the computer system with high privilege credentials (e.g., administrator). By
correlating physical and logical credentials, the CPP Server recognises the intru-
sion and activates cyber-countermeasures (i.e., user session disconnection and190
notification to the control room).
A misuse/anomaly network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), used by
most companies, detects logical intrusions into the server. However, traditional
IDSs do not correlate physical access control and logical access control infor-
mation and therefore they are unable to detect threats as the one described195
above.
4. Vulnerability Modelling of the Insider Threat Scenario
Figure 3 depicts the UML Sequence Diagram (UML-SD) illustrating the
behaviour of the Insider Threat scenario. This UML diagram is annotated with
both CIP_VAM and SecAM UML profiles in order to show the advantages of a200
joint modelling; this notwithstanding, the first steps are constituted by showing
how these two profiles work separately.
4.1. Physical Protection in CIP_VAM
This subsection shows how the CIP_VAM approach is used in the Insider
Threat scenario to evaluate the vulnerability of the system against the attack.205
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<<executionEnvironment>>
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<<executionEnvironment>>
CPP Server
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<<component>>
Signalling Logic
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CyberPhysical IDS
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Terminal Access Monitor
<<component>>
Firewall
<<component>>
Monitor
<<component>>
Door Access
Monitor
<<component>>
Counteraction
{fnr=(value=Pr(idsFNR));
failureRate=(value=Pr(idsFR))};
{fnr=(value=Pr(sensFNR));
failureRate=(value=Pr(sensFR));
successProb=(value=Pr(fog))}
{failureRate=(value=Pr(fogFR));
successProb=(value=Pr(doorAcc))}
{fnr=(value=Pr(doorAccFNR));
Door
Terminal
Router
Figure 2: UML Deployment diagram of the shelter.
At this aim the CIP_VAM profile is used to annotate the infrastructure (the
shelter room), the asset to defend (the signalling service provided by the shelter),
the protection system (the access control mechanism, the presence sensor, and
the fog generator), as well as the sequence of steps performed by the intruder.
In [4], attacks are represented by Use Cases and an Activity is associated210
to each Use Case when a behaviour is detailed. This paper proposes to model
the steps of an attack by means of the messages of a Sequence Diagram as well
as activities of an Activity Diagram. This update mainly consists in modifying
the «Action» stereotype from the Attack package so that it also extends the
UML metaclass Message. From the annotated UML diagrams, a transformation215
generates a BNmodel suitable for evaluating the success probability of an attack.
At this regard, two diagrams are considered: the Deployment Diagram al-
ready presented in Figure 2 (CIP_VAM annotations are grey-highlighted); and
the Sequence Diagram modelling the Insider Threat scenario in Figure 3 where
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Monitor
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IDS
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5.2.2: countermeasure
5.2.2.1: closeConnection()
5.2.2.2: disconnect()
7: exit
6: sabotage
3: moveAround
5: log(user2)
2: enter(user)
1: gainUnauthAccess()
4: gainUnauthAccess()
5.2.1: matching?
class=Password; kind=BruteForce, 
{attack={occurenceProb=Pr(attack); type=Active;
{failure=
   (value=Pr(doorAccFR))}
defenceType=reactive; hitrate=1;
<<action>>
{triggeredBy=[log]}
{level=[Unclassified]}
Figure 3: CIP_VAM and SecAM annotated UML-SD of the Insider Threat scenario.
the following CIP_VAM stereotypes are used: «Site» is used to annotate the220
Room representing the shelter; «Service» is used to annotate the Signalling
Logic (it specifies the main asset of the system by setting a proper value for the
asset tagged value); «ProtectionDevice» is used for protection mechanisms
that are not sensors but security actuators (e.g., the fog generator); «Sensor»
is used for the DoorAccess, the CyberPhysical IDS, and the Presence Sensor.225
Each of these sensors protects an infrastructural item, i.e., the Room (Presence
Sensor) and the Door (DoorAccess).
Each step that is part of the attack scenario (also from a protection point
of view) is annotated with the «Action» stereotype and enriched with useful
11
information by means of proper tagged values.230
An M2M transformation is used to derive the BN model, according to the
rules sketched below.
Rule “Action” nodes. A true/false BN node is generated for each «Action» A:
the true value means that the corresponding attack step has been successfully
accomplished, otherwise the attack step failed/has been neutralised. An arc is235
generated to A from each BN node corresponding to an «Action» TA in the
TriggeredBy list of A, and from each BN node corresponding to a «Protection»
PA that has A in its Counteracts list2. Hence, the CPT of A takes into ac-
count the SuccessProb value of PA, Pr(succPA), and OccurrenceProb of TA,
Pr(occTA). An example is reported in Table 1. The case of more than a TA240
and/or PA can be dealt with supposing that at least one true TA is needed to
activate A and that at least one PA is needed to be true to inhibit A; hence,
the CPT of A can implement a “noisy-OR” mechanism.
Rule “Sensor” nodes. A pair (SS , SE) of true/false BN nodes is generated for
each «Sensor» S. SS represents the availability/unavailability of S; the true245
value of SS (with probability FailureRate) means that the device is working;
otherwise, it is down. An arc is generated from SS to SE which in turn models
the effect of the sensor S: the true value of SE means the sensor successfully
senses/measures the event/quantity for which it is in charge of. An arc is also
added to SE from each BN node corresponding to any «Action» that may be250
performed against infrastructural items («Site», «Object» or «Service») in
its Protects list. Finally, the CPT of SE takes into account the trustworthiness
of S in terms of its false positive rate (Fpr) and false negative rate (Fnr) [19].
2TriggeredBy is a tagged value of «Action» while Counteracts is a tagged value of
«Protection»; the related lists are the collections UML uses to link elements connected by
an association.
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Rule “Protection Devices” nodes. A pair (DD, DE) of BN nodes is generated for
each «ProtectionDevice» D different from «Sensor». DD and DE have the255
same meaning respectively of SS and SE ; hence, this rule works as the previous
one. An example is reported in Table 2.
Table 1: CPT related to the Rule “Action”.
TA PA A = true A = false
true true (1− Pr(succPA)) · Pr(occTA) 1− (1− Pr(succPA)) · Pr(occTA)
true false Pr(occTA) 1− Pr(occTA)
false - 0 1
Table 2: CPT related to the Rule “Protection Device”.
D DS DE = true DE = false
true true 1 0
true false 0 1
false - 0 1
Figure 4 depicts the BN model related to the Insider Threat scenario.
gainUnauthAccess(phy)
door_access
enter moveAround exitlog sabotage
noAccess
CP_IDS
isNotMatching
countermeasure
gainUnauthAccess(cyb)
Firewall
closeconn conn_closed
terminal
disconnect
disconnected
noMatch
Figure 4: BN model of the Insider Threat (CIP_VAM approach).
4.2. Cyber Protection in SecAM
Herein, the SecAM approach is used in the Insider Threat scenario to perform260
a vulnerability assessment. To this aim, SecAM is used to explicitly annotate
the step sequence performed by an intruder.
The Insider Threat scenario described by the UML-SD in Figure 3 has been
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considered as starting point3. For the sake of readability, the UML models con-
tains only the UML annotated elements and tagged values needed to understand265
the generation process of the GSPN model (annotations starting with seca pre-
fix). This scenario has been enriched with Resilience and SecurityMechanisms
SecAM packages [20, 3].
The SecAM::Resilience package contains attack, vulnerability, and intru-
sion concepts, as well as their causal relationships. Thus, these stereotypes270
enable to characterise attacks, vulnerability steps, and intrusions within UML
models.
Similarly, SecurityMechanisms package contains a set of stereotypes to spec-
ify different security devices. These devices share some characteristics, such
as the deployment location, type, defence type, hit rate, and operational rate;275
while others are product specific.
A CyberPhysical Trudy, stereotyped as an unclassified subject, has au-
thorisation to access to the room. This triggers the enter action of the user,
which is notified by the Door Access Monitor to the CyberPhysical IDS (CP_IDS
for short). The CyberPhysical IDS boosts traditional IDSs by adding the capa-280
bility to correlate physical and logical events enabling the modelling approach
proposed in this paper. Then, the subject gains authorisation access to the ter-
minal access by performing an attack with a probability of Pr(attack) (sensitive
analysis parameter). Let us assume that the attacker is able to obtain a valid
password by means of brute-force attack or by social engineering techniques. A285
valid password allows her to get privilege escalation, as she is able to obtain
a granted access through the Terminal Access Monitor. Once the attacker has
logged in, action log of user2 is triggered, whereas a notification is sent by the
Terminal Access Monitor to the CP_IDS. The CP_IDS is stereotyped as lo-
3Regarding this diagram, only SecAM-related stereotypes are used in this subsection.
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Figure 5: Petri Net model of the cyber attack scenario.
cated at the host, having a hit rate of 1 (an ideal CP_IDS), reactive defence290
type, and stateful-based detection.
The intruder proceeds now to sabotage the Signalling Logic, a security ob-
ject stereotyped with a Confidential level. Meanwhile, the CP_IDS checks
whether the logged user matches with the last user who accessed through the
door into the room. When there is not a match (which happens with the295
same probability than attack in fact, annotated with secaStep stereotype),
the CP_IDS alerts the Firewall that closes the active connection. Lastly, the
CP_IDS propagates the user disconnection to the rest of system elements.
The UML-SD described in Figure 3 can be transformed to a formal model
suitable for evaluation. In this paper, we used well-established approaches [25,300
26] to obtain a Petri Net (namely, a GSPN [24]) from the previous UML-SD.
Figure 5 depicts the GSPN obtained as a transformation from the aforemen-
tioned UML-SD, which is suitable for quantitative and qualitative evaluation.
UML-SD lifelines are represented by resource places p16 to p21 (places ini-
tially marked, we have as well labelled them with a comprehensive text), while305
CyberPhysicalTrudy access is represented by firing of transition t1. An access
request will eventually reach place p7 that represents the attempt of login into
the terminal, annotated with a occurrence probability of pi7 = Pr(attack) (see
the optional UML-SD in Figure 3). Thus, a malicious access request is finally
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discarded as indicated by transition t8 (with probability pi8 = 1− Pr(attack)).310
The acquire (release) of a resource has been transformed into a transition
with an input (output) arc. For instance, transition t1 represents the acquire of
the Door Access Monitor, while T2 represents the release of such resource after
some action (represented by the own T2). Activities and self-messages have been
transformed into an exponential transition in the Petri net model. The duration315
of these transitions may be indicated in the UML model using MARTE [12].
For the sake of readability, we have not depicted these annotations.
5. Joint Use of SecAM and CIP_VAM
In this section we show the advantages of the jointly usage of the CIP_VAM
and SecAM approaches. The M2M transformation generating the BN (resp.320
GSPN) from a UML model annotated with CIP_VAM (resp. SecAM) stereo-
types can be defined by taking into account information coming from SecAM
(resp. CIP_VAM) annotations, as proposed in the next subsections.
5.1. Improving the CIP_VAM approach
Here, a “SecAM-aware” extension of the CIP_VAM approach is proposed in325
order to improve its effectiveness. One of the features that SecAM deals with in
a more clear and straightforward way, is the management of the access control
mechanisms.
The weakness of the BN model shown in Figure 4 is in the node isNotMatch-
ing. In fact, its aim is to model the procedure by which the CP_IDS detects330
a mismatch in the identities used for physical and cyber accesses. Without ex-
tensions, only a pure probabilistic mechanism can be embedded in the BN by
defining a proper CPT for this node. This approach does not take into account
the real logic behind an access control ruleset. The centre of the proposed ex-
tension is the explanation of the two roles (used for the physical and the cyber335
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accesses) by means of two UML actors (user and user2 ) that are annotated
with the SecAM «SecaSubject» stereotype. Then, the second step is to an-
notate the «Action» that generates the node isMatching (i.e., the isMatching
UML Message) by means of the SecAM «SecaOperation» stereotype. The use
of SecAM annotations generates a BN with more nodes and arcs connections so340
accounting for more variables and casual relationships. A new rule is added to
the ones described in Section 4.1: for each «Action» A also stereotyped with
«SecaOperation» a subnet is generated consisting of a node corresponding to
A and three additional nodes for each triggering «Action» originated by UML
actors tagged as «SecaSubject» (see as example the BN excerpt depicted in345
Figure 6). Of course, additional arcs are also generated between nodes, but we
omit a deeper description of the rule for sake of brevity.
enter log
isNotMatching
IdEnter IdLog
levelEnter
levelLog
potentialEnter potentialLog
Figure 6: Excerpt of the BN model of the Insider Threat (improved CIP_VAM approach).
5.2. Improving the SecAM approach
Similarly, in this section we consider a “CIP_VAM-aware” extension of the
model transformation shown in Section 4.2 in order to improve its effective-350
ness. The major advantage of CIP_VAM is its ability to annotate the concrete
events that trigger interaction among system components. By bringing these
annotations to a UML model, a PN model can be conformed where system state
transitions depend on the occurrence of specific events.
Figure 7 depicts an excerpt of the Petri net model obtained from the transfor-355
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Figure 7: Excerpt of Petri net model of the Insider Threat scenario.
mation of the Insider Threat UML-SD (see Figure 3), accounting for CIP_VAM
stereotypes. For the sake of space, we only show an excerpt of the generated
model. Three black dots in the figure represent the omitted part of the model.
The use of CIP_VAM annotations produces a Petri net with more places and
arc connections. Each action expressed in the TriggeredBy CIP_VAM tagged-360
value creates a new place. This place is connected by an input arc to the transi-
tion that represents the execution of the trigger action, and by a test arc to the
transitions that represent the execution of the action triggered. For instance, the
place p′gainUnathAccess represents that the execution of the step gainUnathAc-
cess() in the UML-SD of Figure 3. Therefore, an input arc connects transition t′1365
with this place, given that such a transition represents the execution of the ac-
tion. Finally, a test arc connects the place to transition t10, since this transition
represents the step triggered by the previous gainUnathAccess() method in the
UML-SD. Besides, the failure CIP_VAM tagged-value adds also a decision in
the model, represented by place p′ and transitions t′1, t′2, having a probability370
of occurrence given by the value of failure (i.e., pit′1 = Pr(doorAccFR) and
pit′2 = (1− Pr(doorAccFR))).
The obtained PN model when considering both CIP_VAM and SecAM pro-
files is a suitable model for qualitative and quantitative evaluation. For instance,
a probabilistic model checker tool can be used to verify that the sequence of trig-375
gered events is correct. In the next section, we quantitatively evaluate the model
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by comparing the effect of failure rate in attack success.
6. Analysis of the Insider Threat Scenario
This section demonstrates how the evaluation of the vulnerability related to
the Insider Threat scenario can benefit from the joint modelling of cyber and380
physical security concerns. To pursue this objective, we analyse the models
mP , m′P , generated by applying the transformations from CIP_VAM to BN
described in Sections 4.1 and 5.1, as well as the models mC , and m′C generated
by applying the transformations from SecAM to GSPN described in Sections
4.2 and 5.2. Models mP , m′P , are analysed against the variation of a “cyber-385
related” parameter while mC ,m′C , against the variation of a “physical-related”
parameter. The values used in this study are reported in Table 3. Some of them
refer to frequencies (i.e., they are expressed in hrs−1). As they all refer to the
same time period (one hour), they are considered non-dimensional and used to
define probabilities.390
Table 3: Model quantitative parameters.
Name Description Value
Pr(idsFNR) False Negative Rate of the cyber-physical IDS
component of the CPP Server
15 · 10−1
Pr(idsFR) Failure Rate of the cyber-physical IDS com-
ponent of the CPP Server
10−7
Pr(doorAccFR) Failure Rate of the door access device 10−5
Pr(doorAccFNR) False Negative Rate of the door access device 10−2
Pr(doorAcc) Success probability of the door access device 0.9
Pr(firewallFR) Failure Rate of the firewall 10−4
Pr(firewall) Success probability of the firewall 0.8
Pr(terminalFR) Failure Rate of the terminal 10−5
Pr(terminal) Success probability of the terminal 0.9
The models mP and m′P are analysed against variations of the access control
policy. In particular, three cases are considered: (i) no logical access control;
(ii) confidentiality levels are used to determine the logical access (i.e., the Cy-
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berPhysical Trudy succeeds in her intent only if she uses two accounts with
confidentiality at least equal to the one requested to access the resource); and395
(iii) identities are used to determine the logical access (i.e., CyberPhysical Trudy
succeeds in her intent only if she uses the same identities both for the physical
and for the cyber access). The first case is modelled by mP . The second and
third cases refer to the m′P model: the difference between them consists in hav-
ing different CPTs for the A nodes as generated by the additional rule of the400
enhanced model transformation. The results come from the following formula:
Pr(exit = true|gainUnauthAccess(phy) = true) (see Figure 4)4.
The obtained results for the probability of a success in case of attack are:
(i) 1.82 · 10−2; (ii) 6.36 · 10−2; and (iii) 1.90 · 10−1. The model m′P is more
accurate than mP since it takes into account the adopted access control policy.405
Specifically, mP underestimates the probability of having a successful attack,
given that the attacker performs the physical and cyber accesses with the same
identity. The difference between the two vulnerability evaluations is one order
of magnitude.
The models mC and m′C are analysed against variations of the failure rate410
of the door access device: its value is chosen in an neighbourhood of its default
value. Specifically, m′C is analysed considering these values: 10
−1, 10−2 and
10−3 in order to show how variation influences the overall vulnerability analysis.
These results are also compared with the results of the analysis of mC (where
it is assumed that the attacker is always successful in compromising the door415
access control) in order to show the effectiveness of the approach.
Figure 8 depicts the analysis results. We measured the system’s performance
by computing the throughput of transition t1 under different door access failure
4The formula follows the more generic one Pr(success = true|attack = true)). In
this specific case, the names of the BN nodes are computed from the first and the last
«Action»stereotyped messages in the attack scenario model in Figure 3.
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Figure 8: Analysis results of models mC and m′C .
rates. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all timed transitions take 1ms
to fire. In all cases, performance decreases as the attack probability increases.420
Results of model mC represent the case where failure rate is always occurring
and thus the system performance is the lowest. As expected, the performance
of the system increases when door access failure rate decreases. Let us remark
that the use of CIP_VAM enables to consider physical failures in the model,
clearly improving it since it is closer to real world situations where security of425
physical elements can be compromised.
7. Discussion and conclusions
While holistic approaches in system security are theoretically able to take a
picture of all the relevant system aspects and security threats, it does not seem
to exist any single modelling language able to manage the complex structure430
and behaviours of such systems as a whole. Therefore, the only viable solution
is to extend existing modelling languages and possibly to design novel hybrid
formalisms.
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In this paper, we have addressed the limits of model-driven approaches when
modelling cyber-only or physical-only security aspects in cyber-physical systems,435
and more specifically in railway applications. At this aim, two modelling ap-
proaches, oriented to different security-related aspects, have been chosen and
jointly used. They both are based on UML profiling and quantitative model
generation: the CIP_VAM approach has been enriched by AccessControl in-
formation provided considered by the SecAM approach in generating a more440
accurate BN model for vulnerability evaluation; the SecAM approach has been
enriched by the action-triggered annotation and physical failure rates provided
by CIP_VAM in generating a richer GSPN model.
In this context, we have highlighted some issues in separated cyber and phys-
ical security modelling, and proposed a possible solution. We are aware that the445
way is still long and further steps are needed also in order to propose this solu-
tion in other applicative domains. Of course, the loosely coupled approach here
presented must be improved: model transformations must be further detailed,
multi-formalism techniques may be investigated to provide inter-operation be-
tween derived models, a tight integration of the two UML profiles can allow to450
define a more comprehensive and usable modelling language. Nevertheless, we
believe that the work presented in this paper is a concrete and first step towards
cyber-physical vulnerability modelling and analysis.
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